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Abstract: Dairy farming in the Waikato Region has contributed greatly to the reduction of 
water  quality.  Part  of  this  is  attributable  to  the  issue  of  inappropriate  disposal  of  dairy 
effluent.  Regional authority data shows both costs and benefits of complying with effluent 
management regulations. Private costs result from system and management improvements, 
while private benefits are largely due to reduced fertiliser requirements. Decreases in the 
volume  of  'non-compliant  effluent',  resulting  from  improved  compliance,  are  used  as  an 
indicator  to  illustrate  reduced  environmental  effects.  The  benefits  of  becoming  compliant 
outweigh  the  costs  for  half  the  farms  analysed.  More  incentives  are  required  to  promote 
compliance from the other farms although their environmental effects are generally smaller. 
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1  Introduction 
Despite  the  increased  profile  of  environmental  issues  the  quality  of  natural  waterways 
continues to decline. This paper looks at the costs and benefits involved with environmental 
compliance as an incentive to reduce negative environmental effects. The focus is on the 
effects caused by the dairy farming industry in the Waikato Region of New Zealand and 
specifically relates to their compliance with effluent irrigation regulations.  
 
The historic increase in global economic activity resulting from population and per-capita 
income growth, along with the intensification of farming systems, has been matched by a 
growing deterioration of the natural environment. It is well known in the scientific realm that 
all  agricultural  practices  have  impacts  on  the  environment  and,  in  the  past  two  decades 
especially,  interest  from  the  general  public  in  this  area  has  increased.  The  negative 
environmental  effects  of  dairy  farming  are  of  particular  concern.  There  are  many  papers 
(including Cullen, Hughey & Kerr, 2006; Lodge & Rutherford, n.d.; Tait & Cullen, n.d.; 
Takatsuka  et  al.,  2007;  Vant,  2008;  Wilcock  et  al.,  1999)  that  discuss  the  detrimental 
environmental impacts of dairy farming and many of these suggest that outcomes to date have 
understated  the  negative  impact.  A  recent  report  from  Environment  Waikato  (2008)  on 
regional soil and water quality is seen as one of the more realistic publications. 
 
Dairy  farming  damages  water  (both  surface  water  and  groundwater),  air,  ecosystem 
biodiversity and human health (Clark et al., 2007; Tait & Cullen, n.d.). Of these, the impacts 
on water are seen as paramount (Cullen, Hughey & Kerr, 2006; Morriss, 2004). The main 
effects on water are increased levels of suspended solids, inorganic nutrients and pathogens 
and a reduction in available oxygen (Dragten, 2006; Vant, 2006). Common causes of these 
effects  are  allowing  stock  access  to  waterways,  the  mismanagement  of  fertiliser  and  the 
inappropriate  disposal  of  farm  dairy  effluent  (Cullen,  Hughey  &  Kerr,  2006;  Lodge  & 
Rutherford,  n.d.).  Although  it  is  argued  that  fertiliser  and  waterway  management  are  of 
greater environmental concern, both are outside the scope of this research.  
 
Farm dairy effluent is a collective term that includes cow faeces, urine and yard washwater. It 
only includes the controllable volume that is deposited in the cowshed and yard. Farm dairy 
effluent also includes small amounts of udder washwater, milking plant washwater and any 
milk  spillage  (Dragten,  2006;  Fyfe,  2004;  Longhurst,  Roberts  &  O'Connor,  2000;  MAF, 
1994). “Typical New Zealand dairy farm milking practices lead to a considerable transfer of 
nutrients from pastures to the cowshed” (Monaghan et al., 2007, p. 186). This transfer of 
nutrients represents a significant volume of effluent (6-15% of total cow effluent output) that 
requires disposal (Dragten, 2006; MAF, 1994).  
 
Up until the late 1970’s, it was common practise for Waikato dairy farmers to dispose of 
untreated farm dairy effluent directly to surface water. As a result of the increased importance 
of environmental effects, regional authorities have restricted the way that farmers can dispose 
of effluent. There are now two commonly accepted methods of discharging effluent - treated 
discharge to surface water and untreated discharge (irrigation) to land. The careful irrigation 
of effluent to land allows natural soil processes to effectively break it down and results in 
lower environmental effects than discharging effluent to surface water.  
 
The  Resource  Management  Act  1991  (the  RMA)  is  the  main  body  of  environmental 
legislation in New Zealand. The RMA prohibits contaminant discharges unless authorised by 
a regional plan or resource consent (Resource Management Act 1991). Under the RMA, farm 
dairy effluent is a contaminant as it contains a range of characteristics that are likely to affect 
water.  Environment  Waikato  (EW),  acting  under  the  RMA,  is  the  regional  authority  that 
governs  the  use  of  natural  resources  in  the  Waikato  Region.  It  sets  rules  in  the  Waikato   3 
Regional Plan regarding the disposal of contaminants. The rules in the regional plan state that 
no resource consent is required to irrigate farm dairy  effluent to land  as long as specific 
conditions are met. These conditions relate directly to reducing the environmental effects of 
inappropriately  discharged  effluent.  In  the  literature  there  is  considerable  discussion  on 
environmental policy and discussed also, in detail, are the effluent management regulations in 
the  Waikato  Region.  Some  discuss  the  implications  of  the  regulations  while  others  (for 
example Cassells & Meister, 2001) are more constructive and discuss dairying in light of the 
regulations.  
 
The  main  mechanism  to  reduce  the  environmental  effects  of  effluent  has  been  through  a 
tightening of environmental regulations (Cassells & Meister, 2001; Morriss, 2004). Effluent 
disposal - as more of a point-source discharge - is quite a developed issue. This has resulted in 
its regulation being quite developed. As effluent management has relatively straightforward 
regulations, enforcement of non-compliance is a simple policy option. Regulation has been 
used rather than other, more voluntary, pathways given the capital-intensive nature or costs 
associated with becoming compliant (Clark et al., 2007).  
 
To this end, EW undertakes compliance monitoring of dairy farms that irrigate effluent to 
land. A monitoring inspection involves an assessment of the dairy shed, yard, effluent storage 
facility and irrigator. In monitoring a farm effluent system, the activity is assessed against the 
rule  conditions  and  a  compliance  status  is  given.  Compliance  can  range  from  Full 
Compliance, through High Level of Compliance and Partial Compliance, to those that are 
Significantly  Non-Compliant.  A  Significantly  Non-Compliance  status  will  be  assigned  to 
farms that have direct discharges to water, major ponding on the land surface, or, in the 
opinion of the monitoring officer, are likely to have a significantly adverse environmental 
effect.  
 
There has been reluctance to becoming compliant, both in New Zealand and abroad, and this 
has been the focus of much investigation (including Davies, Kaine & Lourey, 2007; Winter & 
May, 2001). Bewsell & Kaine (2006) have gone to the extent of including the impact that 
farm  context  has  on  the  adoption  of  environmental  practices.  Monaghan  et  al.  (2007) 
identifies key barriers as “cost, complexity, compatibility with the current farm system, and a 
perceived uncertainty of actual environmental benefits” (p.181). 
 
The attitudes that farmers hold towards the environment are another topic debated in the 
literature. While some claim that farmers hold a negative view (or even disregard) for the 
environment, others (including Wunderlich, 1991 cited in Chouinard at al., 2008) state that 
farmers are inherent stewards of the land. Many farmers consider that farming in itself is 
maintaining the environment (Ward et al., 1990 cited in Curry, 1996). The notion of farmers 
being environmental stewards should be viewed with scepticism as most of this is based on 
farmer self-assessments. This scepticism is heightened following the importance of cost-based 
motivators.  As  Bewsell  &  Kaine  (2006)  have  pointed  out,  regardless  of  environmental 
attitudes decisions are based more on a systematic evaluation of context and available options.  
 
Winter  &  May  (2001)  divided  motivations  for  environmental  compliance  into  calculated, 
normative,  and  social  motivators.  Although  only  one  of  the  three  motivators  (calculated 
motivations) relates to money, for most farmers it is the most important. Some (including 
Nowak, 1987 cited in Chouinard et al., 2008) argue that although monetary motivators are 
commonly  superior,  the  other  motivators  do  provide  Private  Benefit  -  and  these  can 
sometimes outweigh monetary Private Cost. 
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The  normative  and  social  motivators  both  push  farmers  towards  compliance  whereas  the 
calculated motivators, depending on whether these are costs or benefits, can push farmers 
away.  As  monetary  costs  are  paramount  for  (most)  farmers,  the  easiest  way  to  ensure 
environmental compliance would be to ensure that the actions are profitable. The result would 
be ‘pushes’ towards compliance from all three motivators. Further work in this area is needed 
and, if the findings are positive, could increase the uptake of environmental regulations.  
 
It has been said that those “subject to tighter environmental regulations will incur higher costs 
than firms subject to weaker, or non-existent, environmental regulations” (Cassells & Meister, 
2001, p. 258). This may be accurate in regard to the costs of becoming compliant, however, 
what is missing is the inclusion of (both monetary and non-monetary) Private and Social 
Benefits that result from the environmental compliance subsequently achieved. 
 
This  study  assesses  EW’s  compliance  monitoring  data  for  the  farms  with  the  largest 
environmental effect (those classified as ‘Significantly Non-Compliant’). It assigns a Private 
Cost and Private and Social Benefit to farms becoming compliant with effluent regulations 
and allows the calculation of a Cost Effectiveness. 
 
Social recognition is one of the motivators for environmental compliance (Winter & May, 
2001) and the reason that society would recognise such actions relates to Social Benefit. The 
results of environmental compliance benefit society as a whole (including future generations) 
as an increase in compliance decreases environmental effects. Environmental effect is relative 
to numerous factors (including soil type, receiving environment, etc) and a calculation of the 
actual environmental effect is outside the scope of this research. Instead, the volume of ‘non-
compliant effluent’ is used as an indicator. The indicator shows the volume of effluent that 
will become adequately disposed of as a result of the improved compliance and will provide 
the Social Benefit of reduced environmental effect. 
 
The Private (or Abatement) Cost is the cost a farm faces in becoming compliant. The main 
Private  Cost  of  improving  compliance  relates  to  the  price  and  capital-intensive  nature 
associated with effluent management. Often there are system improvements or a large amount 
of labour required to bring a system to a compliant level: this relates to the size of the milking 
herd. In the case of installing a new system, issues of complexity and compatibility with the 
current system also add to costs. 
 
Improving  systems  or  management  practices  to  become  compliant  with  environmental 
regulations sometimes offer a Private Benefit. Although this is not the case for all farms or for 
all regulations, Private Benefit does come about from improved compliance with effluent 
management regulations. The main Private Benefit is an increase in the amount of effluent 
being effectively utilised as fertiliser. When effluent is irrigated to land it acts as a fertiliser 
because it contains high levels of nitrogen and phosphorus. The fertiliser value of the effluent 
from 100 cows has been estimated to be around $2855/year (M. Bramley, Pers Comm, 10 
September  2008).  The  increase  in  the  quantity  of  effluent  being  effectively  utilised  as 
fertiliser will vary depending on the scale of the compliance improvements and this affects the 
amount  of  savings  that  any  one  farm  would  make.  This  is  the  only  Private  Benefit 
investigated in this study and the volume of ‘non-compliant effluent’ is used to calculate this. 
 
In removing the Private Benefit from the Private Cost, the Net Private Cost shows the actual 
cost of improved compliance. The Net Private Cost can be compared with the Social Benefit 
to show a Cost Effectiveness.   5 
2  Method  
EW’s effluent irrigation compliance monitoring data was looked at for each Significantly 
Non-Compliant  farm.  The  analysis  assessed  the  non-compliance  in  more  detail  and  also 
looked at the problem behind the non-compliance and the solutions required to fix it.  
 
The ‘problem’ is the reason for the non-compliance. On a farm there is usually a combination 
of  reasons  for  the  non-compliance,  however,  there  is  usually  one  dominant  cause  or 
‘problem’. Problems were seen to be either System Failures or Management Failures and 
costs were assigned accordingly. A Management Failure results from a human error. This can 
include a pump not being switched on or the irrigator not being monitored or shifted enough. 
The solution for a Management Failure requires an increase in the time spent monitoring and 
managing the effluent system. Increased training of staff will also reduce the chance of a 
Management  Failure.  A  System  Failure  occurs  when  something  goes  wrong  with  the 
system/mechanics and include pump or irrigator breakdown. Solutions for System Failures 
include increased maintenance or the installation of all or part of a new system. The problems 
were looked at in more detail and a ‘Private Cost’ to become compliant (Abatement Cost) was 
determined. This was based on whether the problem stemmed from a Management Failure or 
a System Failure and was proportional to herd size. 
 
The  total  effluent  produced  on  each  farm  was  estimated  using  a  standard  volume  of 
50litres/cow/day. The environmental effect within the Significantly Non-Compliant category 
can range from a minor spill to a catastrophic event and, because of this, the total volume of 
effluent produced on a farm is not always a reliable indicator. A survey of EW monitoring 
staff allowed a scale of non-compliance to be assigned to each farm and this took into account 
the differing types of non-compliance.  This scale showed a proportion of the total effluent 
that was non-compliant and this volume was used as an indicator of Social Benefit. 
 
The largest Private Benefit is the saving made once the nutrients in the non-compliant effluent 
become utilised as fertiliser. The fertiliser savings was calculated using $2855/100 cows/year. 
The Net Private Cost is the Private Cost subtracting the Private Benefit. This is the actual cost 
to the farmer - although becoming compliant will cost the farmer, this will be subsidised by 
the benefit the farmer gains from the reduced fertiliser costs. 
 
A Cost Effectiveness was calculated from the cost of a farm becoming compliant (Net Private 
Cost) and the reduction in non-compliant effluent (Social Benefit). This is a dollar value per 
cubic  metre  of  effluent.  Assuming  a  linear  relationship,  for  every  dollar  a  farmer  spends 
towards becoming compliant, an X volume reduction in non-compliant effluent results. Using 
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3  Results & Discussion 
Environment Waikato data shows there are approximately 4678 dairy farms in the Waikato 
Region. It showed that 4033 farms irrigate effluent to land and that the number of these farms 
that were randomly monitored during 2006-2008 was around 422 (10.5%) per season. The 
focus  of  this  research  is  only  on  the  9%  of  these  randomly  monitored  farms  that  were 













Figure 1: Compliance of the Waikato dairy farms that irrigate effluent to land 
For  the  Significantly  Non-Compliant  farms,  the  average  herd  size  is  320  cows  (Waikato 
regional average 316 cows) and the average farm size is 118ha (Waikato regional average 
110ha). These figures show that farm and herd size do not appear to effect whether or not a 
farm  is  non-compliant.  Table  1  summarises  the  main  findings  of  this  study,  showing  the 
descriptive statistics of the main characteristic examined. 








Median  Mode 
Upper 
Quartile  Max 
Effluent produced (m
3)  2.50  9.05  16.00  10.77  12.20  8.00  18.13  57.50 
Social Benefit (m
3)  0.56  2.55  7.71  6.55  5.34  2.56  11.05  29.63 
Private Benefit ($)  0.88  3.98  12.06  10.25  8.36  4.00  17.28  46.34 
Private Cost ($)  1.46  4.98  10.46  8.54  8.87  1.46  11.98  59.34 
Net Private Cost ($)  -28.56  -7.55  -1.61  8.67  -0.57  2.65  3.81  16.80 
Cost Efficiency ($/m
3)  -1.44  -0.65  -0.21  2.76  -0.24  0.92  0.97  13.81 
 
Without comparison it is not known whether major non-compliance from a small herd is 
higher or lower than minor non-compliance from a large herd. Figure 2, however, shows that 
there is a strong correlation between herd size and volume of non-compliant effluent. The 
amount of non-compliant effluent (Solution Benefit) for major non-compliance from small 
herds, say under 400 cows, is comparable to minor non-compliance from larger herds. This 
suggests that minor non-compliance from a large herd is more of an issue than major non-




























































Figure 2: Herd size compared to Social Benefit (reduction in non-compliant effluent) 
The actual environmental effect that this would result in was not analysed in this research – 
hence the notion of an indicator. The typical contaminant composition of effluent together 
with other variables such as soil type and the sensitivity of the receiving environment could 
be used to estimate the actual and overall environmental effect of non-compliant effluent. 
 
The Private Cost for the majority (65%) of Significantly Non-Compliant farms is less than 
$10/farm/day. The Private Cost for a Management Failure is, on average, $3.24/farm/day 
more expensive than that for a System Failure. The large System Failures, however, are much 
more expensive than the larger Management Failures and usually require an entirely new 
system. 
 
In regard to the Private Cost of a Management Failure, it may have been better to look at the 
opportunity cost of monitoring the effluent system. This is because labour is already being 
paid for and, although the actual price throughout a year is constant, the worth of each unit is 
not. For example, one hour spent on the effluent system in summer will be worth much less 
than one hour spent during a busy time such as calving. 
 
The average Net Private Cost for becoming compliant is -$1.61/farm/day. A negative Net 
Private Cost means the Private Benefit exceeds the Private Cost. The analysis into Net Private 
Cost shows that the 50% of farms with a negative Net Private Cost would be better off to 
change. The other 50% (those with a positive Net Private Cost) would require some other 
incentive but, for the majority, the incentive needed would be less than $5/farm/day. 
 
Figure 3 shows the Net Private Cost. The red line depicts the level at which the Private Cost is 
equal to the Private Benefit – at any point along this line, a farmer would be indifferent. All 
the farms under this line would be better-off if they improved their effluent system to become 
compliant (Private Benefit is greater than Private Cost). These farmers should improve their 
system simply because the value of the fertiliser they are currently losing is more than the cost 
that would be incurred to utilise it (that is, become compliant). It is not known why these 
farmers have not taken action to improve their system - it may be an information lack or lag 
regarding the size of potential Private Benefit. All the farms above this line would not be 
better-off if they improved their effluent system to become compliant (Private Cost is greater 
than Private Benefit). For these farms there is no monetary incentive to improve compliance.  
 






























































Figure 3: Private Cost compared to Private Benefit 
Figure 4 compares the Net Private Cost to herd size and shows that regardless of whether a 
farm  has  a  negative  or  positive  Net  Private  Cost,  the  larger  the  herd  size,  the  larger  the 
magnitude  of  the  Net  Private  Cost.  Those  to  benefit  from  becoming  compliant  will  gain 





































Figure 4: Net Private Cost compared to herd size 
Farms with larger herd sizes and a positive Net Private Cost are a major problem because, as 
we know from Figure 2, non-compliant effluent is proportional to herd size. The negative 
implication of this is that those with a positive Net Private Cost and a large herd size will not 
only have a large effect but will also be those least likely to become compliant. This is only an 
indirect link at this stage.   9 
 
The trend line in Figure 5 shows that for the typical farm the point at which Private Benefit 
starts  to  exceed  Private  Cost  is  when  the  volume  of  non-compliant  effluent  (Q)  exceeds 
5.7m




Figure 5: Private Benefit v Private Cost Curve 
The average Cost Effectiveness is (-$1.61 ÷ 7.71m
3) $-0.21/m
3 reduction in non-compliant 
effluent. This means that, on average, Net Private Benefit will be $0.21 for each cubic metre 
reduction in non-compliant effluent (or, for every $1 of Net Private Benefit, the result will be 
a 4.80m
3 reduction in non-compliant effluent). This is misleading, however, as it suggests that 
every farm would benefit from becoming compliant – when this is not the case. A more 
accurate approach is to group those with positive Net Private Cost and those with a negative 
Net Private Cost together or to group the values of the Cost Effectiveness. As explained, 51% 
of the farms have a negative Net Private Cost (that is, they would benefit from improving 
compliance). The average Cost Effectiveness for these farms is $-0.73/m
3. At the extreme, 
one farm would have a surplus of $1.44/m
3 from reducing 11.44m
3/day. The average Cost 
Effectiveness for farms with a positive Net Private Cost is $2.64/m
3. At one extreme a farm 
would only need to spend $0.10/m
3 to reduce 2.56m
3/day, compared to the other extreme 
where the farmer would need to spend $13.81/m
3 to reduce 0.6m
3/day.  
 
Figure 6 reduces the concerns previously raised in regard to farms with Net Private Cost and 
large herd sizes. This is done by showing that the majority of farms with large volumes of 
non-compliant  effluent  (large  Social  Benefit)  have  a  negative  Net  Private  Cost.  This  is 
because Private Benefit is directly proportional to the Social Benefit (as both are calculated 
from the volume of non-compliant effluent). In a common circumstance, as the Social Benefit 
increases, the Net Private Cost decreases. The implication of this is encouraging and suggests 
that those with larger volumes of non-compliant effluent (larger effect) should benefit more 
from becoming compliant. 
 




































Figure 6: Net Private Cost compared with Social Benefit 
Projecting the non-compliance rate onto the 4033 farms in the region shows that at any one 
time approximately 363 will be Significantly Non-Compliant. Using these figures, a daily 
surplus of $558 will reduce the volume of non-compliant effluent by 2675m
3. As discussed, 
the straight projection of the average is misleading. A closer analysis shows that 177 of the 
Significantly  Non-Compliant  farms  would  have  a  negative  cost  effectiveness  (on  average 
$0.73/m
3), 110 farms would need to pay around $0.92/m
3 and, at the far end of the scale, there 
would be four farms with a cost effectiveness of $13.81/m
3. 
 
For  farms  with  a  negative  Net  Private  Cost,  the  comparatively  large  Private  Benefit  is 
providing an incentive to become compliant.  For those with a positive Net Private Cost, there 
will need to be some other incentive to promote compliance. In this analysis an assumed goal 
is a 100% reduction in Significantly Non-Compliant farms. 
 
The research identified the volume of non-compliant effluent as an indicator only and this, 
although  quantified,  was  not  assessed  through  into  monetary  terms.  Working  this  into  a 
monetary value would allow a direct comparison between Net Private Cost and Net Social 
Benefit. This would allow a Cost Benefit Analysis to be performed. Some simple inferences 
can be made without quantifying the actual Social Benefit. Once such example would be the 
promotion of a subsidy to promote compliance through reducing Private Costs. This becomes 
complicated, however, as the subsidy would only be necessary for those with a positive Net 
Private Cost. 
 
To ensure a move toward compliance, an incentive would need to be equal to the difference 
between the Net Private Cost and zero. That is, an incentives to reduce Private Cost needs to 









SC = FB (NSC = 0)
Private Cost
Private Benefit
PC = PB (NPC = 0)
 
Figure 7: Private Cost versus Private Benefit showing reduction in Private Cost 
Another means of reducing Private Cost would be to incorporate the cost of enforcement fines 
that would be avoided when compliance is improved. The value of this would be based on 
probability of being caught, probability of a fine and price of the fine. This would be worked 
into the Net Private Cost (lowering it) as it further promotes compliance. 
 
An  alternative  to  reducing  the  Private  Cost  would  be  to  increase  the  Private  Benefit.  To 
ensure  compliance,  the  combination  of  incentives  needs  to  be  equal  to  the  size  of  the 
difference between the Net Private Cost and zero. That is, the increased value of the Private 
Benefit needs to equal the X2-X1 on Figure 8. Some Private Benefits were not incorporated 
into this research. Including these would cause the number of farms with positive Net Private 
Cost (if any remain) to reduce. If these additional Private Benefits reduce all Net Private 








PC = PB (NPC = 0)
 
Figure 8: Private Cost versus Private Benefit showing increase in Private Benefit 
Projecting the recent trend of increased fertiliser prices may, without intervention, flow-on to 
increase  Private  Benefit.  An  alternative  may  be  to  artificially  increase  (tax)  the  price  of 
fertiliser. This would increase Private Benefit and could provide a source of funds to subsidise 
Private Cost. The main problem with this is that all agricultural and horticultural systems use 
fertiliser but it is primarily the dairy industry that requires the incentive of increased Private 
Benefit.   12
4  Conclusion 
 
A  historic  increase  in  global  economic  activity  resulting  from  population  growth  and 
increased  per-capita  income,  along  with  the  intensification  of  farming  systems,  has  been 
matched  by  a  growing  deterioration  of  the  natural  environment.  The  growth  and 
intensification of the dairy industry in New Zealand is not excluded from this trend. The 
environmental damage this sector causes is well recognised. The four key effects of dairying 
are damage to water, air, ecosystem biodiversity and human health. The damage to water is, in 
part, due to poor effluent management. Dairy farming results in a considerable volume of 
effluent, deposited in the cowshed, which requires disposal. Farm dairy effluent contains high 
concentrations  of  contaminants.  Effluent  disposal  needs  to  be  managed  so  that  excessive 
concentrations of these contaminants do not enter water. The most common means to dispose 
of  effluent  is  via  irrigation.  This  utilises  the  natural  soil  process  to  breakdown  the 
contaminants and also allows utilisation of the nutrients as fertiliser. 
 
Environment Waikato is the regional authority in the Waikato Region and regulates effluent 
disposal. About 9% of the farms that irrigate effluent are having the greatest environmental 
effect  and  these  are  classified  as  ‘Significantly  Non-Compliant’.  In  analysing  the 
characteristics of these farms, on average, a total effluent volume of 16m
3/farm/day will be 
produced and about half of this will be non-compliant. Non-compliant effluent is the effluent 
disposed of in a non-compliant manner and is an indicator of Social Benefit. This is because 
when a farm moves away from a Significantly Non-Compliant status, effluent is withheld 
from causing adverse environmental effects and a Social Benefit is gained. 
 
The Private Cost to become compliant (Abatement Cost) averages at $10.46/farm/day and the 
fertiliser  content  of  the  non-compliant  effluent  holds  a  Private  Benefit  of,  on  average, 
$12.06/farm/day. The average Net Private Cost is, therefore, -$1.61/farm/day. A negative Net 
Private Cost means that the Private Benefit is greater than the Private Cost and there is an 
incentive to become compliant.  
 
Of  the  Significantly  Non-Compliant  farms,  half  would  make  money  from  becoming 
compliant.  This  is  because  the  Private  Benefit  gained  when  becoming  compliant  will 
outweigh the Private Cost of system or management improvements. On average these farms 
would  gain  $0.73/m
3  reduction  in  non-compliant  effluent.  The  average  Social  Benefit  for 
these farms is 10.8m
3/day. The Significantly Non-Compliant farms with a positive Net Private 
Cost will need some other incentive to promote compliance. On average these farms would 
lose $2.64/m
3 reduction in non-compliant effluent. The sum of other incentives would need to 




Following  this  research,  additional  investigation  could  further  define  Net  Private  Cost, 
bringing in the emotive benefits of compliance (such as social recognition) and the costs of 
non-compliance  fines.  Further  work  could  also  quantify  the  Social  Benefit  into  monetary 
terms. This would result in a true Cost Benefit Analysis being possible. The preliminary step 
to this, however, may be quantifying the actual environmental effect of the non-compliant 
effluent. 
 
In  summary,  approximately  half  of  the  Significantly  Non-Compliant  farms  that  irrigate 
effluent to land in the Waikato Region would be better-off by becoming compliant. The other 
half,  although  at  present  may  not  have  an  economic  incentive  to  become  compliant,  are 
generally those with lower negative effects on the environment.   13
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